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Double Taxation Treaties and
Transnational Investment: A
Comparative Study
Dr. T. Modibo Ocran*
On the national and international levels, fiscal policy plays a crucial
role in the mobilizing and channeling resources for economic devel-
opment. In the domestic sphere, fiscal policy may be the most
important among the various means available to a government to
mobilize resources and promote economic and social development.
Taxation and budgetary allocation serve as the two major tools of
fiscal policy.
While a good budgetary system encourages channeling of resources
into areas of high development priorities, an appropriately designed
tax system can discourage the use of scarce resources in activities of
low development priorities. Moreover, taxation can be exploited to
encourage a more effective use of more or less idle resources through
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the use, for example, of tax incentives to encourage more labor-
intensive method of production, thereby decreasing unemployment
and underemployment. Similarly, foreign exchange, often one of the
scarcest resources in developing countries, can be increased and
directed to priority areas by means of tax policies which favor export
transactions.
In the international sphere, the role of taxation receives similar
recognition. Economic relations between nations continue to be viewed
in terms of economic interdependence, in which the international
movement of goods and services and the international movement of
factors of production are fundamental.' Transnational actors, how-
ever, are more concerned with the international movement of factors
such as capital and know-how, and the international tax factors
which affect transnational corporations (TNCs).
International tax problems have grown in magnitude as transna-
tional corporations continue to expand their activities in the absence
of generally accepted principles and adequate intergovernmental in-
stitutions dealing with tax matters. There is a widespread feeling, at
least in the developing countries, that TNCs are able to obtain unfair
tax advantages over other forms of enterprises, to the detriment of
most states. 2 Policy makers in these states are, therefore, disturbed
by the possible negative economic impact of tax arrangements with
TNCs; for example, the unfairness of the distribution of gains as
between a TNC and a host state, and the impact on capital accu-
mulation in the host state.
In the taxation of TNCs, there are three main areas of conflict.
These are: (1) the allocation of profits between associated enterprises,
leading to the classic case of double taxation; (2) trade between
associated enterprises (exchange of goods, services, patents and other
know-how property, loans, etc.), raising problems associated with
tax evasion and avoidance; and (3) the determination of a permanent
establishment of TNCs, as a way of avoiding the misuse of tax
havens. The types of income or expenditure which pose particular
problems in this respect include business profits, interest on loans,
1. J.D.R. ADAMs & J. WHALy, THE INTERNATIONAL TAXATIoN OF MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPED COUNTEES 1 (1977); FoLsoM, GORDON, SPANOoLE, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTION 2-8 (1986); JACKSON AND DAVEY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
2-4, 8-10 (1986); CHARLES P. KINDLEBEROER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMfcs (5th ed. 1973); F.
ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT (5th ed. 1984).
2. For references to such concerns, see ADAMS & WHALEY, supra note 1, at 4; MILLER,
Third World Views of the End and Means of United States Tax Policy, UNITED STATES
TAXATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTIES (R. Hellawell ed. 1980).
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administrative expenses, management fees, royalties and other know-
how payments.
This paper examines the legal framework of a number of bilateral
double taxation treaties drawn from various regions of the world
and from different economic systems in order to see how these
fundamental issues are generally treated, and to provide insight into
the general nature of these instruments. As a backdrop to our more
detailed comparative discussion of the role of double taxation treaties
in minimizing these conflicts, this article raises in a general manner
the issues of double taxation; tax evasion and avoidance, in particular
the problem of transfer pricing and tax havens; and finally, the
problem of tax holidays and exemptions. The conclusion summarizes




International double taxation becomes an issue when profit is
subject to more than one charge to tax because it is presumptively
within the tax jurisdiction of two or more countries.3 Put simply,
international double taxation arises whenever the same profit is liable
to tax in two or more countries at the same time. 4 The root of the
problem of double taxation is found in the fact that laws designed
to serve domestic needs differ significantly among countries regarding
the principles of allocating and taxing income and determining per-
manent establishment. In other words, the territorial scope of tax
jurisdiction impacts upon business entities operating in more than
one country. National tax systems are based, in varying degrees, on
either the source of income, residence or nationality of the corpo-
rations concerned, or some combination of these variables.
Apart from the basic jurisdictional problem introduced by the
differing principles, the application of the principles themselves fur-
3. ADA s & WHALLEY, supra note 1, at 41. This introductory discussion draws heavily
on: ADAMs & WHALLY, sufira note 1; J.F. ClowN, TAXATION AN MULTNATIONALENTERPRIsE
(1974); A.R. PREST, PUBLIc FINANCE (5th ed. 1975).
4. This form of double taxation should be distinguished from "economic double taxa-
tion," which is used to describe the phenomenon of the same income flow being subjected to
tax in the hands of different taxpayers during the same period under the same domestic tax
system. See ADAMs & WHALLEY, supra note 1, at 41; ClowN, supra note 3, at 54-56.
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ther affects the distribution of revenues among capital exporting and
importing countries. Under the source principle of taxation, a country
taxes all income earned from sources within its territorial jurisdiction
and generally exempts from taxation income accruing from foreign
sources. 5 Under the residence principle, a country taxes the worldwide
income of persons legally resident within its territorial jurisdiction. 6
For example, if the resident invests in a foreign country and earns
profits there, the home country subjects those profits to its income
tax. According to the nationality principle, taxation is based on the
world-wide income of the nationals or citizens of the country con-
cerned, wherever they are resident. 7 This latter principle, however, is
applied by only a handful of countries. The more common clash of
principles is between taxation at the source of income and taxation
on the basis of residence. 8 The United States uses all three principles-
source, citizenship, and residence-as a basis for income taxation.
In addition to the differing approaches to territorial jurisdiction,
national tax systems also differ in the three basic ways they seek to
integrate corporation tax and personal income tax in the form of
corporate dividends. Under the classical system of corporation tax,
profits accruing to a corporation are first subject to corporation tax.9
In addition, dividend distributions are subject to personal income
tax in the hands of the recipients. These distributions are not de-
ductible from the profits of the company for corporation tax pur-
poses. Thus, distributed profits are subject both to corporation tax
and personal income tax, whereas undistributed profits are subject
only to corporation tax. Under the imputation system, on the other
hand, profits are subject to tax when they are distributed by way of
dividends, as in the classical system. Part of that corporation tax
paid by the shareholder, however, is treated as a credit against his
liability to personal income tax on the distribution.'0 Under the third
system, the two-rate system, one rate of corporation tax applies to
undistributed profits, and a lower rate applies to distributed profits."
Distributed profits are taxed at a lower rate to take account of the
5. A.DAms & WHALLEY, supra note 1, at 10-11, 42-43. See also TII.NoHAST, TAX ASPECTS




9. ADAMs & WHALLEY, supra note 1, at 11, 12, 14, 24-25; MILER, supra note 2, at 234.
10. ADAMS & WHALLEY, supra note 1, at 14.
11. Id. at 15.
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fact that they would also be subjected to personal income tax in the
hands of the shareholder. 12
A further source of differences in national tax practices stems
from the fact that countries have different concepts of what consti-
tutes profit for tax purposes. Even when two different countries have
the same basic rules for tax computation, they may differ in their
interpretation of the facts of particular cases. The upshot of all these
differences in national tax systems and practices is that international
income flows would normally be subject to double taxation in various
respects in the absence of relief arrangements.
In the case of a corporation trading abroad through a subsidiary,
the following would be the situation when the tax codes of both
states are based on the source principle, each state has a classical
system of corporation tax, and there are no double taxation relief
arrangements between the states concerned. The subsidiary would be
liable for corporation tax on trading profits in the host state because
both the source of income and the residence are in the same state.
When it pays a dividend to the parent corporation, that dividend
would be liable for tax in the host state on the ground that the
source, namely shareholding in the subsidiary, is located in the host
state. The parent corporation also would be liable to corporation tax
in the home state on the dividend received from the subsidiary because
it is part of the income of the parent. Additionally, the dividend
paid by the parent out of its income would be subject to the personal
income tax of the home state in the hands of the recipient share-
holders because the latter reside in the home state. Thus, the total
tax burden in this case would be two charges to corporation tax and
two charges in respect of dividends. In the case of a corporation
doing business in an investee state through a branch rather than a
subsidiary, its profits also would be liable to taxation in both states. 13
Normally, however, no corporate dividends would be involved in any
12. Id.
13. Id. at 43. Some countries, however, treat payments from branches to parents as
dividends for the purpose of determining withholding tax liability; and a TNC may suffer a
withholding tax on branch profits in the host state. But this treatment is the exception rather
than the rule. There are additional differences in the tax treatment between branches and
subsidiary corporations which tend to make TNCs favor the latter rather than branches. For
example, some countries have higher corporate rates on branch profits accruing to a foreign
based corporation than on profits of domestic or subsidiary corporations. Branch operations
may also render both the parent and the branch liable to tax in each country on the world-
wide profits of the entire company. Id. at 50-51.
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remittances, and withholding taxes on them would not arise.' 4
The nature of the problem posed for international income flows
by double taxation seems clear from the foregoing. It has become a
general practice for many states to provide some form of relief from
this particular consequence of differing tax principles and practices.
Double taxation relief may take the form of exemption, credit, or
deduction. Under the exemption system, the profits of a corporation
liable to tax in two or more states are taxed in only one of the states
concerned and exempted from tax in the others. 15 The profits may
be exempt from tax in the state of source (exemption on a host
country basis) or exempt from tax in the state where the recipient
resides (exemption on a home basis). Typically, the exemption system
exempts income which has already been taxed in a host country from
further tax in the home country.
Under the credit system, the tax is paid in one state and is then
allowed as a credit against tax liability in the other state.' 6 This
system gives relief from liability in the home country for taxes actually
paid in the host country with a direct crediting of taxes paid in one
locality against taxes to be paid elsewhere. The tax paid in the home
state is the home state tax normally payable minus the foreign tax
paid in the host state.17 The calculation of the tax credit can get very
complicated: the credit may take the form of a direct credit for the
overseas branch operation or an indirect credit for the foreign sub-
14. In addition, there may be withholding taxes on payments of interest from the subsidiary
to the parent corporation; and, in some cases, withholding taxes on royalties.
15. ADAMs & WHALLEY, supra note 1, at 44-45; CHowN, supra note 3, at 17-44, especially
at 42; TYLLiNGHAsT, supra note 5, at 7-8, 45.
16. See generally, ADAMs & WHALLEY, supra note 1.
17. The following example of the U.S. tax credit system is taken from HELLAWELL, The
Home-Country Tax Credit 3.22 in I NEGOTIATING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS: A MANUAL FOR THE
TM= WORLD (Hellawell & Wallace ed. 1982), [hereinafter HELLA ELL & WALLACE].
Suppose Acme Shoes, a Delaware corporation which typically earns $10,000,000 a
year in the United States, established a branch operation (not a subsidiary) in
Taiwan. In 1978 the Taiwan branch earned $1,000,000 and was subjected to a 40%
Taiwanese income tax, or $400,000. Acme is of course taxable in the United States
on its worldwide income. Assuming for simplicity a 50% U.S. tax rate, Acme's U.S.
tax bill before credit would be $5,500,000 ([$10,000,000 U.S. income + $1,000,000
Taiwan income] X 50%). However, Acme would be allowed a credit for Taiwan
income tax of $400,000, which would reduce the U.S. tax to $5,100,000. Notice
that, in effect, Acme has paid $500,000 on its Taiwan income ($400,000 to Taiwan
and $100,000 to the United States). This total rate, 50%, matches exactly the higher
rate of the two countries. This is the way the credit should work: it should eliminate
double taxation but should not lower the overall rate below that of either one of
the countries involved.
In general, the tax credit applies only to foreign income or income-like taxes. It does not
apply to such taxes as export taxes, sales taxes, excise taxes, franchise taxes, etc. Id. at 3.2B.3.
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sidiary.' 8 An adverse feature of the credit principle is that the taxpayer
ends up paying whichever is the higher of the rates in the states
concerned.
With the deduction system, the foreign tax levied on the profits is
allowed as a deduction from the profit liable to tax in the state
concerned. 19 The critical distinction between this system and the credit
system is that under the deduction system the foreign tax is deducted
from the tax base (i.e., treated as a deductible item from income as
computed under the tax system of the taxing state).20 Under the
18. The following example is from HELLAWELL & WALLAcE, supra note 17, at 3.2B.5-
3.2B.6:
Simplex, a Delaware corporation, has a wholly-owned subsidiary organized under
the laws of Xanda (X-Sub). In its first year of operation X-Sub earns $100,000 in
Xanda, pays 30% Xanda income tax of $30,000 and pays a dividend to Simplex of
$70,000.
Step 1. Determine the amount of foreign taxes deemed paid by Simplex. This is
the portion of the foreign taxes paid to X-Sub which 'the amount of such dividends
... bears to the amount of such accumulated profits after foreign tax.
Dividend x Xanda Tax = Taxes Deemed Paid
X-Sub Earnings
After Taxes
$ 70,000 x $ 30,000 = $ 30,000
$ 70,000
Step 2. Gross up the amount of the dividend by adding to it an amount equal to
the taxes deemed paid under step 1.
Dividend + Taxes Deemed Paid = Amount on which U.S. Tax
(before credit) will be computed
(Step 1)
$ 70,000 + $ 30,000 =$ 100,000
Step 3. Compute U.S. tax on the grossed up amount before credit.
$100,000 x 50% (U.S. tax on dividend before credit).
Step 4. Credit the 'taxes deemed paid' amount against the U.S. tax on the grossed
up amount. The result is the net U.S. tax payable by Simplex.
U.S. Tax on - Taxes Deemed = U.S. Taxable
Grossed Up Amount Paid Amount
$50,000 - $30,000 = $20,000
Notice that this comes out 'right.' The total bill on the $100,000 of Xanda earnings
is $50,000: $30,000 to Xanda and $20,000 to the United States. Thus the total rate
is 50%, the same as the U.S. rate.
The process is just the same if the dividend recipient is less than a 100 percent
shareholder or if less than all of the earnings after tax are paid out.
19. ADA.s & WHALLEjY, supra note 1, at 46.
20. Here is a simple example of the deduction system, utilizing a branch operation of
Corp X resident in U.S.:
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credit system the foreign tax, as assessed by the foreign authority, is
accepted as a credit against tax liability in the taxing state. The
deduction system would thus give less relief than both the exemption
and the credit systems, but it does at least prevent the total tax
burden of taxes imposed by the states concerned exceeding 100
percent. The most common solution, and the one used by the United
States, is the tax credit system.
B. Tax Evasion and Avoidance
The effective tax rate a TNC bears on its global operations may
very well differ from the legal tax rate that it should ordinarily
account for. Mechanisms which TNCs often use to cause divergence
between legal and effective tax rates may be conveniently grouped
under tax evasion and tax avoidance. Tax evasion describes the
deliberate and illegal non-payment of taxes which are properly due
(e.g., by the submission of incorrect business returns or of no returns
at all). The important point about tax evasion is that noncompliance
with the tax laws is the result of wilful and conscious failure. Tax
avoidance, on the other hand, occurs where the taxpayer takes
advantage of loopholes in the tax laws or, where doubts exist as to
the interpretation of the laws, the taxpayer takes the benefit of the
doubt in its favor, provided all this is done within the ambit of the
appropriate tax legislation. Tax evasion is considered illegal, while
tax avoidance does not technically infringe the law, even though it
may be equally damaging to the host state and can be morally
reprehensible.
1. Transfer Pricing
One of the methods frequently used to avoid or evade taxation is
transfer pricing, which is normally facilitated by the misuse of tax
havens. Transfer pricing simply refers to the prices used as the
Host State Home State (U.S.)
Branch Income $1,000 Corp X Income
40% Business from overseas: $1,000
Profits tax: $400 Deduction of
foreign tax: $ 400
Taxable Income: $ 600
50% Corporate tax: $ 300
Total Tax Payable on $1,000 earned overseas:
$400 (host state tax) + $300 (U.S.) = $700
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accounting basis for recording intra-corporate transactions (i.e., those
between TNC parents and their subsidiaries or branches, or between
such subsidiaries). 2' The subject of these transactions covers such
things as components manufactured in one country (e.g., by the
parent) and transferred or sold to an affiliate (e.g., a subsidiary) for
use in a higher stage of production in another country; as well as
intangible items such as royalties, know-how, research and develop-
ment, and the interest rates paid on loans between a parent and
subsidiaries. The underlying practice of transfer pricing is to trade
intracorporate goods and services at prices that do not correspond
to international or competitive prices. The object is to facilitate the
functioning of the global system of the corporation at minimum cost
to itself through the avoidance or evasion of relatively high rates of
taxation, exchange controls, regulations on profit repatriation, or
expected losses from impending changes in exchange rates in partic-
ular locations of operation.?
The basic financial structure of the relationship between subsidiary
and parent lends itself to similar manipulation. A TNC may, for
example, attempt to withdraw most of the profits accruing to a
subsidiary by setting it up with a heavily financed loan from the
parent. In this case, the profits are transferred in the form of
repayment of loans and interest. Alternatively, the parent may borrow
from the subsidiary as a way of moving profits to a low tax host
state. Intracorporate dividends also may be converted into capital
gains as a way of remitting profits with tax savings. In this case,
retention of profits by the subsidiary (if located in a low tax area),
followed by liquidation of the subsidiary, may give the parent con-
siderable tax savings owing to the taxation of the capital gains on a
21. ADAMs & WVHALY, supra note 1, at 161; S.H. ROBOCK & K. StmoNDs, INTERNA-
noAL Busnmss AND MuLTiNAIONAL ENTERPRISE 509-510 (3rd ed. 1983); U.N.C.T.C., Intra-
firm Trade, Transnational Corporations in World Development (1983 ST/CTC/46) at 160-62.
22. Two examples of transfer pricing would suffice. Corporation A is located in an
African state where it produces a given product. The Corporation could sell this product
directly in London for £ 100 and increase its total sales figure attributable to the business in
the African state and hence increase its tax liability in that state. Instead, it forms a subsidiary
corporation in a tax haven in the Mediterranean and sells the product to the latter for £ 90.
The interposed corporation then resells the product in London for £ 100, thus making a tax-
free profit of £ 10 and depriving the entity in the African State, corporation A, of that extra
amount.
In another example, let us think of a Corporation B, which is a parent located in the U.S.
It could sell directly to its subsidiary Y located in an African State, its product at $100 and
make a reasonable profit. However, B forms another subsidiary (Z) in a tax haven in Central
America and sells the product to it for $90. Z then resells the product to Y for $110, at a
much higher profit than B would have realized if it had dealt directly with Y.
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realization basis, and the avoidance of dividend withholding taxes.
In some countries, however, capital gains in the hands of a corpo-
ration are taxed as ordinary profits.
The consequences of transfer pricing for the host or investee state
are manifold. One consequence is the reduction of exports through
the overpricing of company goods, with a consequent unfavorable
impact on the balance-of-payments of the host state. Imported inputs,
which are overpriced with a view to reducing profits from operations
in that state and moving them to more favorable tax jurisdictions,
affect the balance-of-payments as well. Underpriced affiliate imports
(under invoicing) affect the volume of import duties and undermine
domestic capital formation through price undercutting. Furthermore,
overpriced affiliate imports (overinvoicing) facilitate otherwise unau-
thorized repatriation of funds. In sum, this results in increased
outflow of funds from the country in which the affiliate operates,
thereby affecting the balance-of-payments situation in many respects.
C. Tax Holidays and Tax Remission
From the standpoint of host states, there are two basic aspects to
the subject of taxation of TNCs. The first aspect lies in the consid-
eration of ways to frustrate the attempts of TNCs to minimize their
tax liability in the host state. This falls within the area of tax evasion
and tax avoidance discussed above. The second aspect, however,
involves various policies to encourage TNCs to invest in or carry on
their projects. The issues of relief from double taxation and direct
tax incentives addresses this latter aspect.
There are several forms of tax incentives, of which the following
are perhaps the more prevalent: (1) corporate income tax holiday,
be it partial or total; (2) capital allowances (e.g., accelerated depre-
ciation); (3) carrying forward of losses for tax deductions; (4) tax-
free dividends to shareholders; (5) tax deduction for research and
development expenditure; (6) employment tax credit; (7) exemption
from property tax (land, mining, and forest dues, etc.); (8) exemption
from indirect taxes such as turnover tax, capital gains tax, patents
tax, sales tax, excise duty, and purchase tax; (9) waiver or deduction
of import duties on equipment, spare parts, and raw materials; (10)
export incentives (such as waiver of export tariff, elimination of
import duties on intermediate goods for the manufacture of export
products, export subsidies, and tariff protection); (11) deferment of
corporate registration fees and stamp duties; and (12) tax-free status
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for salaries of expatriate employees and tax-free interest on loans.Y
The general rationale for these and other tax incentives is to assist
an industry during the initial years of its operation, when there are
recognized hardships, including unfair competition from older enter-
prises. While many recognize and appreciate this purpose, it is
disturbing to note that many host states are too willing to grant tax
incentives which, at least in the short-term, can have adverse effects
on their revenues and balance-of-payments position. In their haste
to grant incentives, host states become entangled in a self-defeating
competition which enable TNCs to play off one country against
another in the siting of projects. In some cases, a tax holiday may
not even benefit the subsidiary in the investee state, but merely may
swell its tax liability in, and hence increase the tax revenue of, the
home state. This would indeed be the case with the United States as
a home state, since it does not accept the practice of "tax sparing.''24
The problems posed by double taxation, tax evasion and avoidance,
and tax incentives, can be dealt with unilaterally (i.e., exclusively by
one state under its sovereign powers), or under reciprocal treaty
obligations, which could take the form of bilateral or multilateral
agreements. There is some debate as to the true value of these
23. OciAN', The Legal Framework of Foreign Investments in Africa, 12 ZAMBiA L.J. 1,
4-6 (1980). See also United Nations, Tax Incentives for Reinvestment, TAx TREATIES BETWEEN
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPInG CouTIniEs, T=amD REPORT, at 92-104 (U.N. Sales No. E.72
XVI.4 1972).
24. Tax sparing becomes relevant where the host state provides some sort of tax holiday
or tax reduction as an incentive to a foreign investor. In that case, the home state would
grant credit for the full amount of foreign tax which would have been charged on the foreign
source income if there had been no tax incentive program. Without complementary tax sparing
provisions in the income tax system of the home state, the entire objective is defeated. "In
effect, the U.S. investor loses the tax benefit of the incentive and, instead, the U.S. Treasury
gets a tax windfall." HELLAWELL, supra note 2, at 98.
The following is an example from HILL ELL & WALLACE, supra note 17, at 3.2C3, 3.2C4:
Suppose a United Kingdom company (UKCO) is operating a branch in a developing
country (LDC) which has granted it a five year tax holiday on all income and
withholding taxes. And suppose a comprehensive tax sparing provision is in the tax
treaty between the two countries. In year three of the holiday UKCO earns £
1,000,000 in LDC. It pays no LDC tax because of the tax holiday. U.K. tax law is
like the United States tax law in that U.K. resident companies (we assume UKCO
is such) are taxable on foreign earnings, subject to a tax credit much like that of
the United States. Thus, UKCO would normally be subject to full U.K. tax on the
£ 1,000,000 earnings. Moreover, it would normally not be able to credit any foreign
tax because it paid none. The tax sparing article provides that UKCO may take a
tax credit against U.K. taxes (subject to normal limitations et al.) in the amount of
taxes it would have paid to LDC if there had been no tax holiday.
As Anthoine notes, tax sparing is widely accepted by Britain in its taxation treaties with
developing countries, but is rejected by the United States. See Anthoine, Provisions in Tax
Laws of Developed Countries (1982); HELLAWALL & WALLACE, supra note 17, at 3.2D16,
3.2D17.
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treaties, since national legislation may actually provide a solution to
double taxation. Indeed, it has been suggested that tax treaties play
only a marginal role in relieving double taxation, and that the major
thrust of tax treaties is to limit taxation by the source country
through the concept of permanent establishment. Hellawell notes that
if there is no "permanent establishment, then only the country of
taxpayer's residence may tax the income; the other state may not tax
even though the income plainly has its source in that state. ' 25 It
should be remembered, however, that the problems go beyond the
relief of double taxation, and involve matters which can be dealt
with more effectively through international cooperation. 26 Most au-
thorities regard unilateral measures for eliminating excessive tax
burdens and harmonizing taxable income as insufficient, and hold
that the satisfactory reconciliation of the conflicting tax claims is
more probable through treaty arrangements. 27
Based on this premise, the United Nations has been promoting the
conclusion of tax treaties since 1967. An Ad Hoc Group of Experts
on Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries was
set up in 1968 composed of tax officials and independent experts.
This Group was given the mandate to explore ways and means of
facilitating the conclusion of these treaties either bilaterally or mul-
tilaterally and to formulate. possible guidelines for use of the treaties. 2
In 1974, the Group of Eminent Persons set up by the United Nations
Secretary-General to study the impact of TNCs on world development
and international relations also took up the theme of tax treaties and
25. Hellawell, Tax Treaties, in HELLAWEL & WALLCCE, supra note 17, at 3.2C1; Owens,
United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in Relieving Double Taxation, 17 Rutgers L.
Rev. 428 (1963).
26. OwENs, supra note 25, at 430.
27. For an account of the development of tax treaties as an answer to the deficiencies of
unilateralism, see VOGEL, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 INT'L. TAx & Bus.
LAW., 10-13 (1986). See also, ADAMs & WHALLEY, supra note 1, at 44-45, 71.
28. The Group of Experts was established under ECOSOC Resolution 1273, 1967. The
Group doubted whether the time was ripe for a multilateral tax agreement, either in an all-
embracing form or on specific tax issues. The mandate of the Group was subsequently
broadened by ECOSOC Resolution 1765 of 18 May 1973.
There are, however, examples of multilateral tax agreements which have been successfully
negotiated. For example, the OECD Model Convention, the Double Taxation Agreement
concluded in 1966 by the Member States of the African and Malagasy Common Organization,
the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation within the Andean Group adopted in
1966 by the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement. For other models of such agreements,
see The Draft Multilateral Agreement prepared by the Nordic Group and the European Free
Trade Association, and the Guidelines Formulated by the UN Group of Experts, reprinted in
ADAMS & WH EY, supra note 1, at 79-111; VOOEL, supra note 27, at 11-13.
There may be areas of multilateral co-operation which do not require formal multilateral
agreements, e.g., a forum for sharing technical experience in the field of tax administration.
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concluded that if the provisions of bilateral treaties were standardized
with only a small number of clauses to be negotiated in particular
cases, they would in fact amount to an international agreement on
taxation.2 9 As it turned out, double taxation treaties stopped at the
bilateral or regional levels; no global multilateral double taxation
treaty has ever been concluded. The United Nations effort has been
limited to the development of a model for use in treaty negotiations
between developed and developing countries.30
A number of fundamental issues must be addressed in a double
taxation treaty, regardless of whether the treaty is bilateral or mul-
tilateral. One of these relates to the bases for the assumption of tax
liability of transnational investors. As explained earlier, tax liability
may be founded either upon the source of income, residence, or
nationality, or some combination of these. Lack of agreement on
the appropriate basis could become a source of confusion and un-
fairness for the investor, the home state, or the host state. Other
fundamental issues involve the category of persons and taxes covered
by the agreement, the specific arrangement or scheme for the elimi-
nation of double taxation among the contracting parties, provisions
against tax avoidance and evasion, non-discrimination as to the
treatment of nationals of contracting states, and procedures for
handling tax complaints from taxpayers.
II. TRANSNATIONAL TAXATION ISsuiEs IN DoUBLE TAxATIoN
TREATEs
Analytically, perhaps the easiest way to present and explain the
framework of bilateral double taxation treaties is to group them into
models by a process of comparison, and by a further comparison of
the models inter se, much in the same way as comparisons have been
made between the OECD Model Double Taxation Convention on
Income and Capital (1977), the United Nations' Model Double Tax-
ation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries (1980),
and the U.S. Department of Treasury Model Income Tax Treaty
(1981). The main tendencies in the practices of the home states of
29. The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International
Relations, (UN Doc. No. E/5500/Rev.1) (1974).
30. UN Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries
(1980) (ST/ESA/102). See also Guidelines for Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing
Countries, (UN Doc. No. ST/ESA/14) (1974). The UN has published subsequent reports on
the subject.
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the major TNCs emerge from the following discussion.3'
Among the elements found in double taxation treaties are provi-
sions on the types of persons and taxes covered. A perusal of any
of these treaties makes clear that they cover persons other than
transnational corporations as well as incomes other than those of
TNCs. Since this article focuses on corporations in general and TNCs
in particular, issues will be analyzed essentially in reference to them,
without implying that they are the only persons so covered.
A. Agreed Basis for Taxation
Tax treaties cover different bases for taxation, such as residence
and permanent establishment. Key phrases, used as terms of art, are
common in this area (including such concepts as center of vital
interest, permanent home, habitual abode, and place of effective
management).
The relevant provisions of the United Kingdom-United States
Convention 2 serve to illustrate most of the pertinent concerns appli-
cable to other treaties. First, the agreement defines residency for a
corporation: a corporation is resident in the United Kingdom if its
business is managed and controlled there, while a corporation is
resident in the United States if it is determined to be a United States
corporation under United States domestic law.3 In general terms,
the phrase "permanent establishment" might seem self-explanatory.
The treaties, however, go to some length to minimize any ambiguity
because of the importance of the concept in the area of double
taxation. In the United Kingdom-United States Convention, the term
refers to a fixed place of business through which the business of an
enterprise is wholly or partly conducted. 34 It includes, but is not
limited to: (1) a branch, office, factory, workshop; (2) a mine, oil
or gas well, a quarry, or other place of extraction of natural re-
sources; and (3) a building construction or installation project which
exists for more than twelve months.
31. For an article by article comparison of the texts of the OECD Model treaties (1963
and 1977), the U.N. Model Treaty (1980) and the U.S. Model Treaty (1981), see K. VAN
RAAn, Model Income Tax Treaties (1983).
32. Tax Convention with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Dec. 31, 1975, Great Britain-United States, 17 I.L.M. 836. [hereinafter United Kingdom-United
States Convention].
33. Id. art. 4. Such domestic criteria are considerably broader using such factors as place
of incorporation and management.
34. Id. art. 5.
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On the other hand, a fixed place of business used solely for one
of the following purposes is not a permanent establishment: (1) the
storage, display, or delivery of goods belonging to the enterprise; (2)
maintenance of a stock of goods belonging to the enterprise for the
purpose of storage, display, or delivery; (3) the maintenance of goods
belonging to the enterprise for the purpose of processing by another
person; (4) maintenance for the purpose of purchasing goods or
collecting information for the enterprise; (5) maintenance for the
purpose of advertising, supply of information, for scientific research,
or for similar activities which have a preparatory or auxiliary char-
acter, for the enterprise; or (6) a building or other installation which
does not exist for more than twelve months. The agreement also
provides that the carrying on of business in another state through a
broker, general commission agent, or any other agent of independent
status, where such persons are acting in the ordinary course of
business, is not considered as having a permanent establishment in
that state.35
A corporation may be resident in one place and yet be considered
as not having a permanent establishment in the place of residence
(e.g., a U.S. corporation which is resident by virtue of the residence
definition in the Convention, but has no permanent establishment in
the United States). The basic principle of residency in the United
Kingdom-United States Convention is found in Article 7. Business
profits of an enterprise are to be taxed only in the state in which it
is resident. Where the enterprise concerned carries on business in the
other contracting state through a permanent establishment situated
there, however, the profits may be taxed in that other state to the
extent of the proportion of profits attributable to that permanent
establishment.
The treaty also deals with the basis for taxation of dividends.
Dividends from a corporation resident in one state derived by a
resident of another state is taxable in the second state (i.e., the state
of residence of the income-receiver) 3 6 On some occasions, the country
of source also may tax the dividends, but this is exceptional.
In the original United Kingdom-United States Convention provi-
sion, dividends from a corporation resident in one state derived by
a resident of another state were to be taxed in the second state (the
35. Id. art. 5, para. 5.
36. Id. art. 10.
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recipient's state of residence).37 The country of source, however,
might also tax the non-resident beneficial owner, except that in that
case the tax is limited to a certain percentage of the gross amount
of the dividends. Under Article 10(5) as amended, dividends from a
corporation resident in one state and paid to a corporation resident
in the second state cannot be taxed by the first state, even if the
dividends consist wholly or partly of profits or income arising in
that state-except insofar as the holding in respect of which the
dividends are paid is effectively connected with a permanent estab-
lishment or fixed base situated in that state.38 The second state,
however, can tax the dividends in the hands of the recipient corpo-
ration even if the corporation paying the dividends is a resident of
both states. Interest income derived from one state by a resident of
the other state is exempt from tax by the first state and taxed by
the resident state. Royalties derived from one state by a resident of
the other state is also exempt from tax by the first state (the country
of source). Hence, they are taxed only by the resident state.3 9
The Netherlands-Singapore Convention 4° is similar to the United
Kingdom-United States Convention. Under Article 3(1), a resident is
a person (legal or natural) who, under the law of that state, is liable
to taxation, whether by reason of domicile, residence, place of
management and control, or similar criterion. Thus, it allows for
differing ways for determining residence and leaves open the possi-
bility of one being a resident in both states on account of the
application of different criteria. Article 3 clarifies the case of a
corporation which, according to the definition of resident in the
convention, 41 is a resident of both states. It provides that in such a
case, the corporation is deemed a resident of the state in which it is
managed and controlled. Thus, in comparison with the United King-
dom-United States Convention, this clause treats the issue of resi-
dency in a less equivocal manner. In the United Kingdom-United
States Convention, the issue of dual residence is left unresolved by
saying that the convention does not apply to dual residency in most
respects.
37. United Kingdom-United States Convention, supra note 32, art. 10.
38. Id.
39. Id. art. 11. Note that royalties and interest are characteristically straight-forward cases
of tax-exemption or waiver, as distinguished from tax credits. See id. art. 12.
40. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with respect to Income and on Capital (with protocol), Feb. 19, 1971, Netherlands-
Singapore, 801 U.N.T.S. 27, art. 3, para. I [hereinafter Netherlands-Singapore Convention].
41. Id. art. 3, para. 1.
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Article 4 of the Netherlands-Singapore Convention employs a
permanent establishment provision identical to the United Kingdom-
United States Convention. The same is true for business profits, 42
dividends, 43 and interest." Some differences exist, however, in the
case of interest: Where interest is taxed by the first state (the state
of source), the tax cannot exceed a given percentage of the amount
of the interest. As with the United Kingdom-United States Conven-
tion, royalties are payable only in the country of residence of the
recipient. This, however does not cover royalties paid for use of
copyright of literary or artistic work, including motion picture films
and tapes for television or broadcasting.45
The Denmark-Trinidad Convention," is similar to the Netherlands-
Singapore Convention. The issues of dual residency and permanent
establishments are dealt with in the same manner as the Netherlands-
Singapore Convention.47 This is also true for the basis for taxation
of business profits, dividends, and interest income. 48 Royalties are
normally taxable in the country of residence of the recipient. How-
ever, where the country of source taxes these items, the amount
cannot exceed a certain percentage of the gross amount of the
royalties .49
The France-Morocco Agreement" deals with the issue of the basis
for taxation." Income from industrial, mining, commercial, or fi-
nancial enterprises are taxable only in the state in which a permanent
establishment is situated. Where an enterprise is permanently estab-
lished in both contracting states, each state may tax only the income
from operations of the permanent establishments situated in its
territory.52 Limitations on such taxable income, however, do exist.
"The taxable income may not exceed the amount of the industrial,
42. Id. art. 7.
43. Id. art. 10.
44. Id. art. 11.
45. United Kingdom-United States Convention, art. 12, para. 6.
46. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and the Encouragement of International Trade and
Investment, June 20, 1969, Denmark-Trinidad & Tobago, 801 U.N.T.S. 257 [hereinafter
Denmark-Trinidad & Tobago Convention].,
47. Id. art. 4, para. 3; art. 5.
48. Id. arts. 7, 10, 11 respectively.
49. Id. art. 10, para. 4.
50. Agreement for the Elimination of Double Taxation and the Establishment of Mutual
Administrative Assistance with Respect to Taxes (with protocol and exchange of letters), May
29, 1970, France-Morocco, U.N.T.S. 329 [hereinafter France-Morocco Convention].
51. France-Morocco Convention, supra note 50, art. 10.
52. Id. art. 10, para. 2.
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mining, commercial or financial profits realized by the permanent
establishments, including profits or advantages derived indirectly
from that establishment or allotted to third parties either by increasing
or decreasing purchase or selling prices or by any other means. Part
of the overhead expenses of the head office is charged against the
earnings of the various permanent establishments in proportion to
their turnover.53 Where this method of apportioning profits is not
feasible, "the amount of profits taxable by each state is calculated
by apportioning the total earnings between the two states in propor-
tion to their turnover realized in their respective territories.5 4 If a
permanent establishment in one state realized "no turnover, or if the
business carried on is not comparable to that in the other state, the
competent authorities of the two states shall consult to resolve the
situation.-
In the United States-USSR Convention, 6 Article 2 provides that
residency is determined according to each country's laws. Article 3
provides that income derived from the following sources within one
Contracting State by a resident of the other Contracting State are
subject to tax only in the other contracting state: (a) rentals, royal-
ties, 7 or payments for equipment, knowledge, experience, or skill;
(b) gains from the sale or exchange of any such rights or property;
(c) gains from the disposition of property received by inheritance or
gift; (d) income from engineering, architectural, designing, and other
technical services furnished at one location in connection with an
installation contract with a resident of the first contracting state and
less than 36 months in duration;5 8 (e) income from the sale of goods
or services through a broker, or agent acting in the ordinary course
of business; (f) reinsurance premiums; and (g) interest on indebtedness
connected with the financing of trade between the United States and
the USSR except where received by a resident of the other contracting
state from a general banking business in the first contracting state.59
53. Id. art. 10, para. 3.
54. Id. art. 10, para. 4.
55. France-Morocco Convention, supra note 50, art. 10, para. 4.
56. Convention Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Matters of Taxation, June 20, 1973, United States-U.S.S.R., 12 I.L.M. 899
[hereinafter United States-U.S.S.R. Convention].
57. United States-U.S.S.R. Convention, supra note 56, art. III, para. 1, at 900.
58. Id. art. III, para. 1, subd. d, at 900.
59. Id. art. III, para. 1, subd. g, at 900. Income arising in connection with certain
activities is not to be attributed to taxable income (when such activities are conducted within
one contracting state by a resident of the other contracting state); the purchase of goods or
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Several agreements deal with the issue of residency and resolve the
dual residency contingency in a manner unlike the United States-
USSR Convention resolution: West Germany-Morocco Convention,60
Denmark-Sweden Agreement, 61 Belgium-Italy Convention, 62 West
Germany-Singapore Agreement,6  France-Brazil Convention, 64 Brazil-
Denmark-Portugal Convention,65 Denmark-Malaysia Agreement,6 and
Finland-France Convention.6 7 These agreements provide, generally,
that a resident of a contracting state is a person whose income is
liable to taxation in that state by reason of domicile, residence, place
of management, or similar criterion. 68 As to the residence of persons
other than individuals, these agreements provide that where such
persons are residents of both contracting states, they will be consid-
ered residents of the state of their place of effective management. 69
merchandise; the use of facilities for the purposes of storage or delivery of goods or merchandise
belonging to the resident of the other contracting state; the display of goods or merchandise
belonging to the resident of the other contracting state, and also the sale of such items on
termination of their display; advertising by a resident of the other contracting state, the
collection or dissemination of information, or the conducting of scientific research, or similar
activities, which have a preparatory or auxiliary character for the resident. Id. art. III, para.
2, at 900.
60. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Income and Capital
(with final protocol and exchange of letters), June 7, 1972, West Germany-Morocco, 966
U.N.T.S. 207, art. 4 [hereinafter West Germany-Morocco Convention].
61. Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income
and Fortune, Nov. 16, 1973, Denmark-Sweden, 927 U.N.T.S. 61, art. 4 [hereinafter Denmark-
Sweden Convention].
62. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Regulation of Certain
other Matters With Respect to Taxes and Income, Oct. 19, 1970, Belgium-Italy, 924 U.N.T.S.
201, art. 4 [hereinafter Belgium-Italy Convention].
63. Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income
and Capital (with protocol) Feb. 19, 1972, West Germany-Singapore, 922 U.N.T.S. 213, art.
2 [hereinafter West Germany-Singapore Convention].
64. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes and Income (with protocol), Sept. 10, 1971, France-Brazil, 857
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter France-Brazil Convention].
65. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income,
April 22, 1971, Brazil-Portugal, 834 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Brazil-Portugal Convention].
66. Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income (with exchange of notes) Dec. 4, 1970, Denmark-Malaysia,
860 U.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Denmark-Malaysia Convention].
67. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Fortune, Sept. 11, 1970, Finland-France, 818
U.N.T.S. 29 [hereinafter Finland-France Convention].
68. West Germany-Morocco Convention, supra note 60, at art. 4; Denmark-Sweden
Convention, supra note 61, at art. 4; Belgium-Italy Convention, supra note 62, at art. 4; West
Germany-Singapore Convention, supra note 63, at art. 2.
69. Where, by virtue of the initial determination of residency, an individual is a resident
of both states, these agreements use a five step procedure to resolve the problem of dual
residency. First, the individual is deemed a resident of the contracting state in which he has
a permanent home available to him. Second, if he has a permanent home available to him in
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Numerous other agreements have similar formats. The Japan-
Switzerland Convention 7o provides that a resident is any person who,
under the laws of that contracting state, is subject to taxation by
reason of domicile, residence, place of head or main office, place of
management, or any other similar criterion. The term "resident"
does not include any person liable for tax in that contracting state
solely because it derives income from sources therein. Furthermore,
in the case of Switzerland, the term includes partnerships created or
organized under Swiss law.7' Where dual residency arises under the
provisions of the treaty, the competent authorities are to determine
by mutual agreement the contracting state of which the individual
will be a resident for the purposes of the convention. A corporation
or other legal person considered a resident of both contracting states
by applying the provision above, shall be deemed a resident of the
contracting state in which its head or main office is situated.
The Japan-Singapore Convention 72 resolves the dual residency issue
by having the competent authorities of the contracting states deter-
mine by agreement the residency of a person for the purpose of the
convention. 73 This is also the case in the Japan-Korea Convention. 74
For this latter agreement, however, the mutual agreement mechanism
is to be used only where an individual is considered a dual resident.
The agreement goes into some detail to provide criteria determining
the basis of taxation of a permanent establishment. 75 The Netherlands-
both contracting states, he shall be deemed to be a resident of the contracting state with which
his personal and economic relations are closest (center of vital interests). Third, if the
contracting state in which he has his center of vital interests cannot be determined, or if he
has not a permanent home available to him in either contracting state, he shall be deemed to
be a resident of the contracting state in which he has a habitual abode. Fourth, if he has a
habitual abode in both contracting states or in neither of them, he shall be deemed to be a
resident of the contracting state of which he is a national. Fifth and last, if he is a national
of both contracting states or of neither of them, the competent authorities of the contracting
states shall settle the question by mutual agreement. See e.g., West Germany-Morocco Con-
vention, supra note 60, art. 4.
70. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income(with exchange of notes) Jan. 19, 1971, Japan-Switzerland, 827 U.N.T.S. Ill [hereinafter
Japan-Switzerland Convention].
71. Id. art. 4.
72. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (with protocol and exchange of notes), Jan. 29,
1971, Japan-Singapore, 827 U.N.T.S. 213 [hereinafter Japan-Singapore Convention].
73. Id. art. 4, para. (2).
74. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (with protocol and exchange of notes), Mar. 3,
1970, Japan-Korea, 799 U.N.T.S. 247, art. 3, para. 3 [hereinafter Japan-Korea Convention].
75. Id. art. 4.
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Indonesia Agreement, 76 the United Kingdom-Barbados Agreement,
77
Denmark-Kenya Convention, 78 Great Britain-Zambia Agreement,
79
and Belgium-United States Convention, 80 in most respects, treat the
issue of dual residency in the same manner as the group of agreements
above.
Under the China-Japan Convention, 81 a resident of a contracting
state means any person who, under the laws of that contracting state,
is liable for tax by reason of domicile, residence, place of head or
main office, or similar circumstance. 82 Where a person is a dual
resident (a resident of both contracting states), then the contracting
states will agree upon the residence of that individual. When a person
other than an individual is a dual resident, they shall be considered
a resident of the contracting state of their head or main office.
Under Article 5 of the China-Japan agreement, a permanent es-
tablishment is a fixed place of business through which the business
of an enterprise is wholly or partly conducted. The term includes a
place of management, a branch, an office, a factory, a workshop,
and a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or other place of extraction
of natural resources. Also, a building site, a construction assembly
or installation project, or supervisory activities connected with these
activities constitute a permanent establishment if the site, project, or
activities continue for more than six months. An enterprise of a
contracting state is considered to have a permanent establishment in
the other contracting state if it furnishes, outside that contracting
state, consultancy services through employees or other personnel,
76. Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Fiscal Evasion with Respect
to Taxes on Income and on Capital (with protocol), Mar. 5, 1973, Netherlands-Indonesia, 969
U.N.T.S. 375 [hereinafter Netherlands-Indonesia Convention].
77. Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Tax on Income and Capital Gains, Mar. 26, 1970, Great Britain-Northern
Ireland-Barbados, 767 U.N.T.S. 61 [hereinafter Great Britain-Barbados Convention].
78. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Dec. 13, 1972, Denmark-Kenya, 896
U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Denmark-Kenya Convention].
79. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Mar. 22, 1972, Great Britain-Northern
Ireland-Zambia 915 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter Great Britain-Northern Ireland-Zambia Conven-
tion].
80. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, July 9, 1970, Belgium-United States, .... U.N.T.S.
-, 23 U.S.T. 2687, T.I.A.S. No. 7463 [hereinafter Belgium-United States Convention].
81. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes and Income, Sept. 6, 1983, Peoples Republic of China-Japan,
23 I.L.M. 120, art. IV [hereinafter China-Japan Convention].
82. Id. art. V.
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other than an independent agent. Merely carrying on business in the
other contracting state through a broker, general commission agent,
or any other independent agent does not accord permanent establish-
ment status to an enterprise, provided that the agents are acting in
the ordinary course of their business. Unless an enterprise carries on
business in the other contracting state through a permanent estab-
lishment, profits of an enterprise of a contracting state are taxable
only in that contracting state.83 Profits earned through a permanent
establishment in the other contracting state may be taxed in that
other contracting state, but only attributable to the permanent estab-
lishment.
Dividends paid by a resident corporation of one contracting state
to a resident of the other contracting state may be taxed in that
other contracting state. The dividends also may be taxed in the
contracting state of which the corporation paying the dividends is a
resident. If, however, the recipient is the beneficial owner of the
dividends, the tax charged must not exceed ten percent of the gross
amount of the dividends 4 Royalties and interest income are treated
similarly. 85 The United States-Trinidad & Tobago Convention86 sets
forth as the general rules for taxation that a resident of one of the
contracting states is taxable by the other contracting state only on
income derived from sources within that other contracting state.87
II. ARRANGEMENT FOR ELIMINATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION
Conceptually, arrangements for the elimination of double taxation
could provide that certain classes of income are wholly exempt from
tax in the source country (so that they can be taxed fully in the
country of residence); assessed at reduced rates of tax in the source
country (with the consequent differential payable in the country of
residence); or taxed fully in the source country (and the amounts
involved credited to or deducted from any taxes otherwise payable
at the residence). 88
83. Id. art. 7.
84. Id. art. 10.
85. Id. arts. 11, 12.
86. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, and the Encouragement of International Trade and
Investment (with proces-verbal exchange of ratifications), Jan. 9, 1970, United States-Trinidad
& Tobago, 22 U.S.T. 164, T.I.A.S. No. 7047 [hereinafter United States-Trinidad & Tobago
Convention].
87. Id. art. 3, para. 1.
88. ADnms & WHLE, supra note 1, at 41. Compare this with the approach of the
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Although the net results of relevant treaty provisions are often
quite similar, the language used to achieve these results varies from
treaty to treaty. The Japan-Korea Convention provides that Korea
must allow a Korean resident or corporation a "credit" against
Korean tax, for "the appropriate amount of tax paid or to be paid
to Japan.''89 Japan is also to allow the same credit treatment to a
Japanese resident or corporation for tax payable in Korea. The
Korean tax credit, however, cannot exceed that proportion of Korean
tax which the income from sources within Japan bears to the entire
income subject to Korean tax.9
Another treaty, between Brazil and Portugal, 9' utilizes the deduc-
tion method. Here, where a resident of a contracting state derives
income which may be taxed in the other contracting state, the first
contracting state allows as a "deduction" from the tax on the income
of the resident an amount equal to the tax paid in the other
contracting state.92 Like the Japan-Korean Convention, however, this
deduction on the tax payable must not exceed that part of the tax
of the first state, as computed before the deduction is given, which
is appropriate to the income taxed in the other state.93 Interest income
is not subject to these provisions. 94
The France-Morocco Agreement treats the elimination of double
taxation rather thoroughly. 95 Treatment of double taxation depends
upon the particular source of the income.
OECD Model Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Income and Capital, reprinted in ADAms & WHAIVY, supra note 1, at 80, which provides that
where a resident of one state carries on business in another state, the profits of that business
shall be taxable only in the state of residence, unless the person carrying on the business has
a permanent establishment in the other state. "Permanent establishment" is defined to mean
a fixed place of business in which the business of the enterprise is wholly or partly carried
on. Where a resident carries on a business in another state through a permanent establishment,
the state of permanent establishment can tax the business profits attributable to that establish-
ment. If double taxation results from this process, and the two states concerned practice the
exemption system, the profits of that entity will be taxable in state II where it carries on
business, but exempt in state I where the company itself is resident. If the two states have the
credit system contained in the treaty, the profits will be liable to tax in state II (the investee
state) and that tax will be a credit against the company's liability to tax in state I (the resident
state) in respect of these profits.
89. Japan-Korea Convention, supra note 74, art. 18, para. 1.
90. Id. at art. 22.
91. Brazil-Portugal Convention, supra note 68.
92. Id. art. XXII, para. 1.
93. Id. art. 22.
94. Id. art. XXII, para. 2.
95. France-Morocco Convention, supra note 50.
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Income from immovable property, including profits from agricul-
tural and forestry enterprises, shall be taxable only in the state in
which the property is situated. 96
Income from industrial, mining, commercial, or financial enterprises
shall be taxable only in the state in which a permanent establishment
is situated. 97
Where an enterprise maintains permanent establishments in both
contracting states, each state may tax only the income derived from
the operations of the permanent establishments situated in its ter-
ritory. 98
The agreement delineates the treatment to be accorded other forms
of income, including, but not limited to, dividends, interest, director's
emoluments and percentages, royalties, and pensions and annuities. 99
Two agreements contain provisions similar to those of the Japan-
Korea Convention on the elimination of double taxation. The Japan-
Switzerland Convention states that subject to the provisions of the
laws of Japan regarding the allowance as a credit against Japanese
tax, Swiss tax payable, in respect of income arising in Switzerland,
is credited against the Japanese tax payable for that income. '° As
for dividend income paid by a company which is a Swiss resident to
a company which is a Japanese resident, and which owns not less
than twenty-five percent either of the voting or total shares of the
company paying the dividend, the credit shall include the Swiss tax
payable by the first-mentioned company in respect of its profits.'0 '
Furthermore, this agreement includes a clause generally found in
many of the other agreements. This provision reserves for Switzerland
an effectively higher rate of tax for residual income taxable in
Switzerland in accounting for income taxable in Japan by applying
the rate of tax which would have been applicable if the exempted
income had not been exempted.' ° The Japan-Singapore Convention
deals with these issues in a similar fashion.' 3
The United Kingdom-United States Convention also details the
arrangement for double taxation controls.'1 The United States allows
96. Id. art. 9.
97. Id. art. 10, para. 1.
98. Id. art. 10, para. 2.
99. Id. arts. 13-17.
100. Japan-Switzerland Convention, supra note 70, art. 23, para. 1.
101. Id.
102. Id. art. 23, para. 2.
103. Japan-Singapore Convention, supra note 72, arts. 21-22.
104. United Kingdom-United States Convention, supra note 32, at art. 23.
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resident corporations a credit against United States tax for the amount
of tax paid to the United Kingdom for partial business carried out
in the United States. As for the payment of dividends by United
Kingdom corporations to United States corporations, where the United
States corporation owns at least ten percent of the stock of a United
Kingdom resident corporation, the United States allows a tax credit
for the amount of tax paid to the United Kingdom by the United
Kingdom corporation on profits out of which the dividend is paid.15
Tax credits are not to exceed the limitations provided for by United
States law for the taxable year. 1" The United Kingdom reciprocates
by allowing similar tax credits for like profits. 0 7
The net effect of this tax credit arrangement is that the appropriate
tax is first paid to the tax authorities of the state where the tax
liability arises (i.e., the source of the income). The amount of tax
paid is then credited against the overall tax payable to the authorities
of its state of residence or nationality. From the source country's
standpoint, this is certainly not a case of tax exemption.
As already noted, certain other agreements do not employ the tax
credit scheme.108 Rather, these agreements allow a deduction against
tax payable to the country of residence or nationality up to the
amount of tax paid to the authorities in the country which is the
source of the income. The Netherlands-Singapore Convention further
exemplifies this difference in treatment. In computing the taxable
income of its residents, the Netherlands includes income or capital
earned in the other state and taxable by the latter.'09 Part of the tax
which bears the same proportion as the income from the other state
already included in its computation of the taxable income, and paid
to the other state, is allowed as a deduction from the taxes collected
by the Netherlands." 0 Singapore, on the other hand, adopts the tax
credit system: Tax payable in the Netherlands is allowed as a credit
against Singapore tax payable in respect of that income."'
Under the Denmark-Trinidad & Tobago Convention, both states
use the credit system of double taxation avoidance," 2 unlike the
105. Id. art. 23.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Netherlands-Singapore Convention, supra note 40.
109. Id. art. 24, para. 1.
110. Id. art. 24, para. 2.
111. Id. art. 24, para. 6, subd. a.
112. Denmark-Trinidad & Tobago Convention, supra note 46, art. XX.
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separate schemes adopted by The Netherlands and Singapore."' The
United States-USSR Convention provides for the elimination of dou-
ble taxation through tax deductions.1 4
The Peoples Republic of China-Japan Convention provides for
deductions and tax credits." 5 Expense deductions against profits of
a permanent establishment are allowed to the extent that they are
incurred for the purposes of the permanent establishment, including
executive and general administrative expenses, regardless of where
the expenses actually arose." 6 In other respects, China and Japan
employ a tax credit system." 7 Where a resident of the first state
derives income from the other, second contracting state, the amount
of tax payable to the first contracting state on that income is allowed
as a credit against the tax imposed by the second contracting state
on that resident."' Treatment of dividends is also reciprocal." 9 Except
where income derived from Japan is a dividend paid by a company
which is a resident of Japan to a company which is a resident of
China and which owns not less than ten percent of the shares of the
company paying the dividend, the credit will take into account the
Japanese tax payable by the company paying the dividend in respect
of its income. Conversely, the percent of ownership required of a
Chinese company receiving dividends from a Japanese resident com-
pany is twenty-five percent of the voting shares (or total shares
issued) of the paying company.'20
The West Germany-Singapore Agreement on the elimination of
double taxation closely resembles the China-Japan Convention. 2' In
computing the tax on a West German resident, income derived from,
and capital situated within Singapore, which may have been taxed in
Singapore, is excluded from the basis upon which West German tax
is imposed; subject, however, to West Germany's reserved right to
take into account in the determination of its rate of tax the items
of income and capital so excluded.'2 Dividends receive typical treat-
ment; a twenty-five percent ownership stake is required of the West
113. Netherlands-Singapore Convention, supra note 40, art. 24.
114. United States-U.S.S.R. Convention, supra note 56, art. IV.
115. China-Japan Convention, supra note 81.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. art. 23, para. 1.
119. Id. art. 23.
120. China-Japan Convention, supra note 81, art. 23.
121. West Germany-Singapore Convention, supra note 63, art. 23.
122. Id. art. 23, para. a.
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German company of the Singapore company's stock. 23 Income de-
rived in Singapore, for which tax payments can be credited against
the West German tax on this same income, include certain dividends
not covered in the discussion above (i.e., certain interest, royalties,
and other remuneration).2A The tax credits accorded under these
provisions are not to exceed that part of the West German tax, as
computed before the credit is given, which is appropriate to these
items of income.2 5 Tax credit treatment for Singapore residents is
much the same as for West German residents. 26 Similar arrangements
are provided for the Finland-France Convention. 127 The Denmark-
Kenya Convention, too, is very similar in providing for tax credits.'2
The Denmark-Malaysia Agreement uses a deduction and credit
combination. 129 Subject to relevant Malaysian laws, Danish tax pay-
able, whether directly or by deduction, for income derived from
Denmark, is credited against Malaysian tax payable in respect of that
income.130 When the income is a dividend paid by a company, which
is a Denmark resident, to a Malaysian resident, the tax credit will
take into account Danish tax payable on the income of the company
paying the dividend.13 1 Where, however, a Danish resident derives
income subject to Malaysian tax (in accordance with the convention),
Denmark will allow as a deduction from the payable Danish tax for
the income subject to tax in Malaysia.132 Certain restrictions limit the
extent of tax credits granted regarding certain types of income and
the ceiling of the tax credit. 133
The Denmark-Sweden Agreement uses a deduction method of
eliminating double taxation in respect of income for fortune. 34 Again,
the tax credit must not exceed that part of the income or fortune
tax, calculated in the absence of a deduction, which corresponds to
123. Id.
124. Id. art. 23, para. b.
125. Id.
126. West Germany-Singapore Convention, supra note 63, art. 23.
127. Finland-France Convention, supra note 67, art. 23.
128. Denmark-Kenya Convention, supra note 78, art. 25.





134. Denmark-Sweden Convention, supra note 61, art. 25. Where a resident of one state
receives income or owns fortune which, according to this agreement, may be taxed in the
other contracting state, the first contracting state shall allow as a deduction from the income
tax or fortune tax of the person in question an amount corresponding to these taxes paid in
the other contracting state.
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the income or fortune that may be taxed in the other contracting
state. 35 Profits are afforded similar tax credit treatment. The United
Kingdom-Barbados Agreement uses a tax credit arrangement regard-
ing both income and dividends. 3 6
The agreements between Germany and Morocco 3 7 and Belgium
and Italy'38 also exhibit similarities. In the former convention, West
German residents having income arising in Morocco are to have this
income exempted from West German tax. 139 West German authorities
can still take this income into account in calculating its own rate of
income tax.140 For dividends, the exemption only applies where the
dividends are paid by a Moroccan resident company limited by shares,
to a joint stock company, which is a resident of West Germany and
which directly holds at least twenty-five percent of the voting stock
or voting shares of the first mentioned company. 14 West Germany,
furthermore, provides a tax credit for Moroccan taxes paid on certain
income. 42 Similar reciprocal treatment is granted by Morocco in all
major respects. 43 The Belgium-Italy Convention is quite similar. 144 It
provides, however, that where losses of an enterprise in one state
having a permanent establishment in the other state have been
effectively deducted from the profits of the enterprise for the purpose
of taxation in the first state, no exemption applies in the first state
to the extent that profits have been exempted from tax in the other
state because they are offset by the losses. 45
The Great Britain-Zambia Convention summarily disposes of the
issue of avoiding double taxation.'4 Where, in accordance with the
convention, a person is relieved from tax in a contracting state, and
that person is subject to tax in the other contracting state on the
same income, the relief from tax allowed under the agreement in the
first state will apply only to the amount remitted or received. 47
135. Id. art. 24.
136. Great Britain-Barbados Agreement, supra note 77, art. 22.
137. West Germany-Morocco Convention, supra note 60, art. 23.
138. Belgium-Italy Convention, supra note 62, art. 23.





144. Belgium-Italy Convention, supra note 62, art. 23.
145. Id.
146. Great Britain-Northern Ireland-Zambia Convention, supra note 79, art. 6.
147. Id.
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The Netherlands-Indonesia Agreement uses a deduction method to
eliminate double taxation. 48 First, in imposing tax on one of its
residents, each state may include in the basis upon which taxes are
imposed the items of income or capital which, according to the
agreement, may be taxed in the other state.149 For the Netherlands,
the deduction from the amount of tax (computed in conformity with
the provision immediately above) is to be equal to that part of the
tax which bears the same proportion to this tax as the part of the
income or capital which is included in the basis. 50 Additionally, the
agreement stipulates rules for deductions for the various types of
royalties and dividends, and provides reciprocal provisions for In-
donesia. 51
Three other agreements use a tax credit arrangement for the
elimination of double taxation: United States-Trinidad & Tobago
Convention, 52 France-Brazil Convention, 53 and Belgium-United States
Convention. 54 By way of example, the France-Brazil Convention
provides that where a Brazilian resident derives income taxable in
Brazil according to its domestic laws, and the income is taxed in
France in accordance with the agreement, Brazil will allow a tax
credit equivalent to the tax paid in France.'55 The tax credit is not
to exceed that part of the Brazilian tax which is appropriate to the
proportion the income bears to the total income taxable in Brazil. 56
Dividends also receive limited tax credit treatment.
57
III. PRovIsioNS AGAINST TAx AvoIDANCE AND EVASION
International tax treaty provisions covered under this topic include
allocation of expenses, secrecy covenants, apportionment of profits,
and information exchange. The United Kingdom-United States Con-
vention serves as a useful archetype for analytical purposes. 58 The
"apportionment of profits" clause effectively states that where a
resident enterprise in one state carries on business in the other




152. United States-Trinidad & Tobago, supra note 86, art. 4.
153. France-Brazil Convention, supra note 64, art. 22.
154. Belgium-United States Convention, supra note 80, art. 23.
155. France-Brazil Convention, supra note 64, art. 22.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. United Kingdom-United States Convention, supra note 33, art. 7, para. 2.
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contracting state through a permanent establishment (branch or sub-
sidiary), each state must attribute to that permanent establishment
the profits which it would be expected to make if it were a distinct
and separate enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities.'59
In other words, states are to estimate and then allocate to the
permanent establishment in the second state those profits which it
would make if it were wholly independent. 6' This is commonly
referred to as the arm's length principle requiring fair dealing in
trade and profits allocation.'16
Just as the profits are allocated on a pro rata basis, so too, are
the expenses associated with the permanent establishment. 62 Expenses
incurred for the purposes of the permanent establishment are treated
as viable deductions against the profit allocated to the establish-
ment.'6 These expenses include reasonable executive and administra-
tive expenses, research and development expenses, and interest. 64
The next major issue in the United Kingdom-United States Con-
vention deals with problems of transfer pricing as an aspect of tax
evasion. Article 9 provides that where an enterprise resident in one
state is associated with an enterprise in another state, and the two
enterprises would have paid taxes on income in the first state but
for commercial or financial conditions imposed between the two
entities which differ from those which would have been made between
independent enterprises, then any income or payments affected by
the conditions may be taken into account in computing the profits
or losses of that enterprise in the other state.165 The latter state must,
however, make such adjustments as may be appropriate to the
amount of tax charged on those points.'6 Any disagreements as to
the amount taken into account in the computation process will be
resolved by mutual agreement between the parties. 67
Another principal clause in the United Kingdom-United States
Convention details the exchange of information and mutual admin-





163. United Kingdom-United States Convention, supra note 32, art. 7, para. 2.
164. Id. art. 7, para. 5.
165. Id. art. 9.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. United Kingdom-United States Convention, supra note 32, art. 26.
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formation available under their respective tax laws to execute the
transforming provision, prevent tax fraud, and administer statutory
provisions against legal avoidance of taxes. 169 Certain limitations are
imposed on this exchange; no information which would divulge a
trade or business or industrial secret shall be exchanged. For admin-
istrative assistance, the parties are to consult with each other for the
purpose of cooperating and advising on any action to be taken in
implementing the exchange of information provision. 70 Naturally,
the treaty provides for the resolution of disagreement over the
amounts taken in account in computing the taxable profits and losses
by requiring the parties' mutual agreement.' 7'
The Singapore-Netherlands Agreement employs provisions very
similar or identical to the United Kingdom-United States Conven-
tion. 7 2 The Peoples' Republic of China-Japan Convention also con-
tains provisions on these issues. 73 First, profits are to be allocated
(and taxed accordingly) to the subsidiary or branch operation on a
pro rata basis as if it were a wholly independent enterprise. 174
Expenses attributable to the branch also are to be appropriately
deducted from the allocated profits. 175 The treaty contains language
controlling the allocation of profits where, but for existing conditions
on commercial or financial relations, the enterprises would be con-
sidered separate entities and their profits would be taxable. 76 The
profits are, therefore, allocated and taxed as if the enterprises were
wholly distinct. 77 Information is to be exchanged to carry out the
provisions of the agreement, enforce the local tax laws of the
respective states, or to prevent evasion of taxes covered by the
agreement. 78 The information is accorded confidential status and
may be disclosed only to persons involved in the collection or
assessment of the pertinent taxes. 79 Restrictions prevent disclosure
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. art. 9.
172. Netherlands-Singapore Convention, supra note 40. For subsidiaries or branches, see
art. 7, para. 2; for associated enterprises and arm's length treatment, art. 9; and for information
exchanges and administrative assistance, art. 27.
173. China-Japan Convention, supra note 81, art. 7.




178. China-Japan Convention, supra note 1, art. 7, para. 1.
179. Id.
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of trade, business, industrial, or commercial secrets or information,
as that would be contrary to public policy.180
The Denmark-Malaysia Agreement 18 1 and the Denmark-Kenya
Convention182 are also similar with respect to tax avoidance and
evasion. Information is to be exchanged to carry out the agreements'
provisions, prevent fraud, prevent underpayment of taxes for reasons
other than fraud (i.e., other fiscal evasion), or to administer statutory
provisions against legal avoidance.'83 Both conventions declare any
information exchanged to be treated as secret; only persons concerned
with the assessment or collection of the taxes shall have access to
the information. '4
Article 27 of the Great Britain-Zambia Convention 85 contains
provisions quite similar to the two Danish agreements. Additionally,
information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, or
professional secret or any trade process may not be exchanged. 86
Five other conventions treat these issues in nearly identical fashion:
Japan-Singapore Convention, 187 France-Brazil Convention,'88 West
Germany-Morocco Convention, 8 9 West Germany-Singapore Agree-
ment, 190 and Netherlands-Singapore Convention.' 9' Using the Japan-
Singapore Convention as a basis for discussion, note that the con-
tracting states are to exchange any information as is necessary for
(1) carrying out the convention's provisions, (2) preventing fraud, or
(3) the administering statutory provisions against tax avoidance. 92
Information exchanged is to be accorded secrecy status and cannot
be disclosed to any person other than those, including a court,
concerned with the assessment and collection of the tax or the
determination of appeal in relation thereto, and in the case of the
West Germany-Morocco Convention, to the judicial authorities for
the purpose of criminal prosecution in respect of such taxes. 93
180. Id. art. 26, para. 2, subd. c.
181. Denmark-Malaysia Agreement, supra note 66, art. 22.
182. Denmark-Kenya Convention, supra note 78, art. 28.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Great Britain-Northern Ireland-Zambia Convention, supra note 79, art. 27.
186. Id.
187. Japan-Singapore Convention, supra note 72, art. 24.
188. France-Brazil Convention, supra note 64, art. 26.
189. West Germany-Morocco Convention, supra note 60, art. 26.
190. West Germany-Singapore Convention, supra note 63, art. 26.
191. Netherlands-Singapore Convention, supra note 40, art. 26.
192. Japan-Singapore Convention, supra note 72.
193. West Germany-Morocco Convention, supra note 60.
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In no case should these treaty provisions be construed to impose
the following obligations on a contracting state: (1) to carry out the
administrative measures at variance with the laws or administrative
practice of that or of the other contracting state; (2) to supply
particulars which are not obtainable under the laws or in the normal
course of administration of the contracting states; (3) to supply
information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial,
commercial, or professional secret or trade process, or information,
the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy.
Two other agreements deserve review. The France-Morocco Agree-
ment covers information exchange and administrative assistance. 194
The two states are to assist and support each other in the collection
of taxes to which the agreement relates, and of any tax increases,
surcharges, overdue payment penalties, interest and costs pertaining
to the said taxes, with the exception of those of a penal nature,
where such sums are finally due under the laws or regulations of the
requesting state. 195 Documentation must accompany the assistance
requests as required by the laws of the requesting state. The docu-
mentation serves as evidence that the sums to be collected are finally
due. 196 Once the requested state receives the documents, it is to serve
writs and take measures so as to satisfy the collection and recovery
of taxes due.197
The Belgium-Italy Convention also contains information exchange
provisions aimed at discouraging tax avoidance or evasion.1 98 Article
26 provides that the competent authorities of each state shall exchange
information as is necessary for carrying out the convention and the
domestic laws of each contracting state to the extent that the domestic
laws deal with taxes covered by the agreement and taxation is effected
in accordance with the agreement. 199 Information exchanged pursuant
to the agreement must be treated as a secret.200 Other than' the
taxpayer or his agent, the information can be disclosed only to the
person or authorities concerned with the assessment or collection of
the taxes which are the subject of this convention, and to the judicial
194. France-Morocco Convention, supra note 50, art. 29, at 1.
195. Id. art. 29, para. 1.
196. Id. art. 29, para. 2.
197. Id. art. 29, para. 3.
198. Belgium-Italy Convention, supra note 62, art. 26, para. 1.
199. Id.
200. Id.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 2
authorities. 20 1 The agreement contains the usual provisions aimed at
safeguarding certain information.202
The Denmark-Sweden Agreement contains a provision governing
the issue of associated enterprises2°3 regarding the possibility of
transfer pricing. The convention provides that where an enterprise
of one contracting state participates directly or indirectly in the
management, control, or capital of an enterprise of the other con-
tracting state, and conditions are imposed between the two enterprises
in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those
which would be made between independent enterprises, any profits
which, but for those conditions would have accrued to one of the
enterprises, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and
taxed accordingly. 2 The agreement also provides that where a ques-
tion relevant to the issue arises in one of the contracting states, the
competent authority of the other state must be informed with a view
to making the necessary adjustment in connection with the calculation
of the profits of the enterprise which is a resident of that other
state.2°5 Apportionment of profits can be arranged by special agree-
ment of the contracting state. 20 This is reminiscent of the provision
in the United Kingdom-United States Convention on associated en-
terprises. 207
IV. NoNDIsCRUMINATION
The subject of non-discrimination involves several interrelated is-
sues. First, the treaties deal with the determination of which persons
are accorded the non-discriminatory protection of the treaties; whether
as nationals, citizens, mere residents, or stateless persons. Second,
the conventions deal with protection in respect of permanent estab-
lishments as well as foreign-owned or foreign-controlled enterprises.
Third, the instruments refer to the kinds of exemptions and reliefs
to which nationals of the other contracting state are entitled. As the
following treaties evidence, most bilateral double taxation treaties
grant national treatment. Occasionally, however, one encounters most-
201. Id.
202. Belgium-Italy Convention, supra note 62, art. 26, para. 1.
203. Denmark-Sweden Convention, supra note 61, art. 9.
204. Id. art. 9, paras. a, b.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. United Kingdom-United States Convention, supra note 32, art. 9.
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favored-nation (MFN) treatment for nationals of the other contract-
ing state.
The Brazil-Portugal Convention,2 8 France-Brazil Convention,2 and
Japan-Switzerland Convention 210 contain provisions defining the
meaning of a "national" for the respective countries. In the case of
the Brazil-Portugal Convention, national means:
(1) all individuals possessing the nationality of a contracting state;
(2) all bodies corporate deriving their status as such from the law
in force in a contracting state; and
(3) all entities which, not being bodies corporate, are treated as
such, for tax purposes, by the legislation of a contracting state.21'
The France-Brazil Convention uses identical language. 2 12 The Japan-
Switzerland Convention also defines nationals in respect of each
contracting state in similar terms.2 3 All three treaties provide that
nationals of one contracting state must not be subject to any taxation
or connected requirements more burdensome than the taxation and
connected requirements to which nationals of that other state in the
same circumstances are or may be subjected. 21 4
The Brazil-Portugal Convention2 15 and France-Brazil Convention 216
contain nearly identical provisions dealing with non-discriminatory,
national treatment for permanent establishments in the other state,
where the enterprise carries on the same activities as national estab-
lishments. 21 7 Neither agreement, however, obliges a contracting state
to grant residents of the other contracting state any personal allow-
ances, reliefs, and reductions for taxation purposes on account of
civil status or family responsibilities which it grants to its own
residents.2 18 Similar nondiscriminatory protections are granted to
enterprises of a contracting state whose capital is wholly or partly
owned or controlled by one or more residents of the other contracting
208. Brazil-Portugal Convention, supra note 65, art. XXIII, para. 2.
209. France-Brazil Convention, supra note 64, art. 24, para. 2.
210. Japan-Switzerland Convention, supra note 70, art. 24, subd. 2.
211. Brazil-Portugal Convention, supra note 65, art. XXIII, para. 2.
212. France-Brazil Convention, supra note 64, art. 24, subd. 2.
213. Japan-Switzerland Convention, supra note 70, art. 24.
214. Brazil-Portugal Convention, supra note 65, art. XXIII; France-Brazil Convention,
supra note 64, art. 24; Japan-Switzerland Convention, supra note 70, art. 24.
215. Brazil-Portugal Convention, supra note 65, art. XXIII, para. 3.
216. France-Brazil Convention, supra note 64, art. 24, para. 3.
217. Brazil-Portugal Convention, supra note 65, art. XXIII, para. 3; France-Brazil Con-
vention, supra note 64, art. 24, para. 3.
218. Brazil-Portugal Convention, supra note 65, art. XXIII, para. 3; France-Brazil Con-
vention, supra note 64, art. 24, para. 3.
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state.2 9 Taxation or connected requirements cannot be different (or
more burdensome) than those to which national enterprises are
subject. 2 0
The agreements between Denmark and Kenya,22' West Germany
and Morocco,' Great Britain and Zambia,2  and Peoples' Republic
of China and Japan22 all provide similar protections through nearly
identical language. The Finland-France Convention also treats the
outlined issues in a similar manner.25 Some notable exceptions,
however, do exist. The most significant distinction is the provision
found in the latter agreement dealing with stateless persons. 226 State-
less persons are not to be subject in either contracting state to any
taxation or any connected requirement which is more burdensome
than that treatment accorded nationals of the other contracting state
in the same circumstances. 227
The Japan-Singapore Convention and West Germany-Singapore
Agreement also resemble the model agreements discussed insofar as
non-discriminatory treatment is concerned. 228 Some minor distinctions
include the use of the words "citizens or nationals" in the former
agreement, and only "citizens" in the latter.229 Thus, unlike those
agreements examined above where nationals also receive national
treatment, in some other agreements, only citizens receive such treat-
ment. In the Japan-Singapore Convention, however, this provision
granting national treatment to citizens or nationals of the other
contracting state is not to be construed as obliging Singapore to
grant to nationals of Japan, who are not resident in Singapore, those
personal allowances, reliefs, and reductions for tax purposes which
are by law available only to citizens of Singapore. 20 Likewise, the
provisions granting national treatment to permanent establishments
219. Brazil-Portugal Convention, supra note 65, art. XXIII, para. 4; France-Brazil Con-
vention, supra note 64, art. 24, para. 4.
220. Brazil-Portugal Convention, supra note 65, art. XXIII, para. 4; France-Brazil Con-
vention, supra note 64, art. 24, para. 4.
221. Denmark-Kenya Convention, supra note 78.
222. West Germany-Morocco Convention, supra note 60, art. 24.
223. Great Britain-Northern Ireland-Zambia Convention, supra note 79, art. 25.
224. China-Japan Convention, supra note 81.
225. Finland-France Convention, supra note 67, art. 24.
226. Id. art. 70, para. 3.
227. Id.
228. Japan-Singapore Convention, supra note 72, art. 22; West Germany-Singapore Agree-
ment, supra note 63, art. 24, para. 1.
229. Japan-Singapore Convention, supra note 72, art. 22; West Germany-Singapore Agree-
ment, supra note 63, art. 24, para. I.
230. Japan-Singapore Convention, supra note 72, art. 22, para. 1.
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in the other contracting states are not to be construed as obliging
either state to grant to citizens, nationals, or residents (depending
upon the particular treaty) of the other contracting state those
personal allowances, reliefs, and reductions for taxation purposes
which are by law available only to residents of the first contracting
state or available on account of civil status or family responsibilities
or any other personal circumstances which the contracting state grants
to its own residents.231
In most respects, the Denmark-Malaysia Agreement and United
Kingdom-Barbados Agreement are similar to the two preceding agree-
ments. 232 The Belgium-United States Convention generally accords,
with one difference. 233 Although permanent establishments are granted
national treatment in either contracting state, this national treatment
protection is not wholly unconditional. Belgium has reserved the right
to tax the total profits attributable to a permanent establishment
which is maintained in Belgium by a United States corporation, or
any unincorporated entity which is a United States resident, at a rate
equal to the highest rate at which the profits of a Belgium corporation
may be taxed.2 4
The Denmark-Sweden Agreement also includes the same type of
national treatment protections to nationals, permanent establish-
ments, and foreign-owned or foreign-controlled enterprises of either
state.235 Article 25 of the agreement provides:
The provision on permanent establishment, however, do not imply
the right to exemption in a contracting state from taxation on
dividends paid or other payments made to a company which is a
resident of the other contracting state.2 6
Furthermore, where the permanent establishment belongs to a joint-
stock company or company assimilated to a joint stock company in
the other contracting state, either contracting state may tax income
derived from the permanent establishment in accordance with the
rules of that state's own legislation.237 This taxation must correspond
to the tax on undistributed profits levied on joint stock companies
which are residents of the other contracting state. 238
231. Id. para. 2.
232. Denmark-Malaysia Agreement, supra note 66, art. XXIV; Great Britain-Barbados
Agreement, supra note 77, art. 26.
233. Belguim-United States Convention, supra note 80, art. 24.
234. Id.
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The United States-Trinidad & Tobago Agreement also contain
limits on the national treatment accorded permanent establishments,
as do most conventions.23 9 The France-Morocco Agreement contains
a national treatment formula and provides that nationals of one
contracting state liable for taxation in the territory of the other state
are entitled to, under the same conditions as nationals of that other
state, such exemptions, relief, rebates, and reductions of any taxes
or charges whatsoever, as may be granted in respect of family
dependents.24? The Belgium-Italy Convention also entitles certain
individuals to these exemptions and abatements. 2A2 The agreement
includes provisions covering national treatment for stateless persons,
nationals, and permanent establishments of the other contracting
state.243
One agreement in particular, the United States-USSR Convention,
ensures both MFN and national treatment to citizens of one state
who are residents of the other contracting state.? The MFN treat-
ment provides that citizens will not be subject to taxes more burden-
some than are generally imposed in the other contracting state on
citizens or representatives of residents of third states carrying on the
same activities. 245 Where, however, tax benefits are granted to citizens
or representatives of third states pursuant to special agreements, one
contracting state is not obliged to grant to citizens or representatives
or residents of the other contracting state the same benefits. 2A6 In all
other material respects, the agreement is similar to the agreements
discussed above.247
V. PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING TAx COMPLAINTS FROM CORPORATE
TAXPAYERS
The procedures by which corporate taxpayers complain or object
to taxation levied upon them are comparatively similar in most double
taxation treaties. Among the relevant provisions dealt with in the
conventions, the following prove noteworthy: (1) resolution of tax-
239. United States-Trinidad & Tobago, supra note 86, art. 6.
240. France-Morocco Agreement, supra note 50, art. 5.
241. Id. art. 5, para. 2.
242. Belgium-Italy Convention, supra note 62, art. 24.
243. Id. paras. 3, 5.
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ation discrepancies through mutual agreement; (2) preservation of
national remedies; (3) resolution of difficulties associated with con-
vention interpretation or application; (4) statute of limitations; and
(5) details for further communication between the two contracting
states.
The United Kingdom-United States Convention provides that where
a corporation feels that the actions of one or both states will result
in taxation which is not in accordance with the Convention, the
corporation may present its case to the competent authority of the
state of which it is a resident. 248 In evaluating this provision, two
points of primary importance come to mind. First, one must look
elsewhere in the convention to determine precisely what constitutes
"taxation which is not in accordance with the convention." Second,
the complaining corporation presents its objection to the state of
which it is a resident.
Upon the corporation's presentation of the objection, the receiving
state, if it feels that the corporation's objection is justified, and it
is unable to resolve the issue on its own, must endeavor to resolve
the case by mutual agreement with the appropriate authorities of the
other contracting state. 249 Resolution of the case is accomplished by
taking measures to avoid unlawful taxation. Refunds of taxes paid
are to be made where necessary. This procedural facility is not the
exclusive remedy for the corporation; the corporation preserves rights
under applicable national laws. Authorities of the two contracting
states are also required to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties
or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of the
Convention. This effort is particularly important with respect to the
attribution of income, deductions, credits, and allowances of an
enterprise to its permanent establishment. 20
The Netherlands-Singapore Convention and Denmark-Trinidad-To-
bago Agreement employ nearly identical language on all of the above
matters.2 1 Numerous other treaties also contain very similar provi-
sions. The Denmark-Sweden Agreement, West Germany-Singapore
Agreement, and Netherlands-Indonesia Agreement serve to illustrate
these similarities.212 First, as in the treaties discussed above, where
248. United Kingdom-United States Convention, supra note 32, art. 25.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Netherlands-Singapore Convention, supra note 40, art. 25; Denmark-Trinidad &
Tobago Convention, supra note 46, art. XXI.
252. Denmark-Sweden Convention, supra note 61, art. 26; West Germany-Singapore Con-
vention, supra note 63, art. 25; Netherlands-Indonesia Convention, supra note 76, art. 25.
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the corporation (or resident) considers that measures or actions of
one or both of the contracting states will result in taxation not in
accordance with the agreement, the resident may, without affecting
its remedial rights available under national laws of the party states,
present its case to the competent authority of the contracting state
of which it is a resident.253
If the objection is considered to have merit and the competent
authority is unable to arrive at a satisfactory or appropriate solution,
that authority must endeavor to resolve the case through mutual
agreement with the competent authority of the other state with a
view to the avoidance of taxation not in accordance with the agree-
ments.25 4 Beyond this resolution of declared taxation disputes, the
agreements provide that the states are to resolve disputes or diffi-
culties as to interpretation or application of the agreements.2 5 As
for avoiding double taxation not provided for ifi the agreements, the
competent authorities may consult with each other to reconcile pos-
sible differences. 256
The West Germany-Morocco Convention, 25 7 Japan-Switzerland
Convention, 25 8 Japan-Singapore Convention,259 Great Britain-Zam-
bia,260 United States-USSR Convention, 261 and Finland-France
Convention 62 treat these issues in like fashion, except that the Fin-
land-France Convention is not so specific; it contains a clause pro-
viding that the competent authorities of the contracting states shall
settle the mode of application of the convention. 263 The Denmark-
Malaysia Agreement and France-Brazil Convention are similar in all
relevant respects to the more typical of these provisions. 264
253. Denmark-Sweden Convention, supra note 61, art. 26; West Germany-Singapore Con-
vention, supra note 63, art. 25; Netherlands-Indonesia Convention, supra note 76, art. 25.
254. Denmark-Sweden Convention, supra note 61, art. 26, para. 2; West Germany-Singa-
pore Convention, supra note 63, art. 25, para. 2; Netherlands-Indonesia Convention, supra
note 76, art. 25, para. 2.
255. Denmark-Sweden Convention, supra note 61, art. 26, para. 3; West Germany-Singa-
pore Convention, supra note 63, art. 25 para. 3; Netherlands-Indonesia Convention, supra
note 76, art. 25 para. 3.
256. Denmark-Sweden Convention, supra note 61, art. 26, para. 4; West Germany-Singa-
pore Convention, supra note 63, art. 25 para. 4; Netherlands-Indonesia Convention, supra
note 76, art. 25 para. 4.
257. West Germany-Morocco Convention, supra note 60, art. 25.
258. Japan-Switzerland Convention, supra note 70, art. 25.
259. Japan-Singapore Convention, supra note 72, art. 23.
260. Great Britain-Northern Ireland-Zambia Convention, supra note 80, art. 26.
261. United States-U.S.S.R. Convention, supra note 56, art. XI.
262. Finland-France Convention, supra note 67, art. 25.
263. Id. art. 25, para. 5.
264. Denmark-Malaysia Convention, supra note 66, art. 25; France-Brazil Convention,
supra note 64, art. 25.
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The France-Morocco Agreement deals with the issues in somewhat
different language.26 5 Under the agreement, if a taxpayer asserts that
certain actions of the other contracting state are not in accordance
with the convention, it may submit an objection to the competent
authorities of the other state, not necessarily the state of which it is
a resident. 266 Obviously, an objection against the actions of the state
of which it is a resident would be filed in that same state.267 The
rest of this agreement is much like the others discussed above.
The Belgium-United States Convention, 268 Brazil-Portugal Conven-
tion,269 Denmark-Kenya Convention, 270 Belgium-Italy Convention, 271
and China-Japan Convention, 272 although similar in most respects to
the treaties discussed above, include statutes of limitations clauses.
The Belgium-United States Convention allows a corporation to pres-
ent a complaint or objection within two years from the date of
notification or collection of taxes. 273 The remainder of the agreement
follows the other conventions above. The Brazil-Portugal Convention
provides that a resident's application must be submitted within two
years from the date of notification of the tax which has given rise
to the objection; or, in the case of taxation in both states, from the
date of notification of the second taxation; or, in the case of a tax
payable by deduction at the source, from the date of payment of
the income which has been taxed even if the objection relates to the
second taxation.274 The Denmark-Kenya Convention stipulates that
the case must be brought within three years of the date of the
disputed action, or the latest of the disputed actions as the case may
be. 275 The Belgium-Italy Convention provides that written application
by a complaining resident must be submitted within two years from
the date of notification or of deduction at the source of the second
taxation. 276 Lastly, the China-Japan Convention allows two years for
the presentation of an objection, provided that a complaining per-
265. France-Morocco Convention, supra note 50, art. 31.
266. Id. art. 31, para. 1.
267. Id.
268. Belgium-United States Convention, supra note 80, art. 25.
269. Brazil-Portugal Convention, supra note 65, art. 27.
270. Denmark-Kenya Convention, supra note 78, art. 27.
271. Belgium-Italy Convention, supra note 62, art. 25.
272. China-Japan Convention, supra note 81, art. 25.
273. Belgium-United States Convention, supra note 80, art. 31.
274. Brazil-Portugal Convention, supra note 65, art. XXIV para. 1.
275. Denmark-Kenya Convention, supra note 78, art. 27, para. 1.
276. Belgium-Italy Convention, supra note 62, art. 25, para. 1.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 2
son's case comes under the scope of national protection. 277
VI. ComMENTARY
This article has attempted to outline the importance of taxation in
international capital flows and domestic capital formation; the prob-
lems posed by differing tax systems and policies for international
investment; and the types of income or expenditure which create the
greatest source of conflict among capital importing and capital ex-
porting countries. In addition, this article has discussed in some detail
the issues of double taxation and tax evasion and avoidance, espe-
cially the manner in which the latter are promoted by the use of
transfer pricing and tax havens. This article also touched briefly on
the nature, rationale, and dangers of tax incentives, such as tax
holidays, as a way of promoting TNC investment. The article does
not discuss another equally important aspect of the analysis of tax
treaties; namely, their formal interpretation, which lies outside the
framework of our present concern. 271
With respect to the problem of double taxation, the interest of
host states requires increased efforts to conclude bilateral and regional
tax treaties in which the principle of source of income would be
enshrined as the basis for the assumption of tax liability by TNCs.
This would cover various types of incomes such as business profits,
interest on loans, management fees, and other payments for intellec-
tual property, to the extent that they either arise from, or are used
in, local operations. 279 Indeed, the Group of Experts on Tax Treaties
(the Group), in the main thrust of its formulations, favored the
primacy (though not the exclusivity) of the principle of source as the
277. China-Japan Convention, supra note 81, art. 25, para. 1.
278. For an excellent treatment of this topic, see VoGEL, supra note 27, at 29.
279. Most developing countries as host states are unlikely to be faced with many situations
in which their own nationals would have greater income from foreign sources, than foreign
nationals would have from sources in such host countries. Thus, such countries would tend
to lose if the trend were to move from tax assessment on a "source" to a "residence" basis.
Thus, the domestic tax laws of host states could be so framed that business profits are
deemed to have their source in the host state to the extent that they arise from or through a
branch or a permanent establishment such as a subsidiary; from contracts entered into or
carried out in the host state; and from the operations of dependent agent in that state. Interest
paid on loans could be deemed to have a source in the host state if a loan is used by the
borrowing subsidiary and claimed as a deduction in the host state, irrespective of where the
loan is in fact borrowed. Management fees paid by a subsidiary to its overseas parent could
by deemed to have a local source in the host state and to be assessed at full corporation rate
in the hands of the parent. Finally, royalties and other payments for know-how could also be
deemed to have a source in the host state when deducted by the subsidiary TNC in arriving
at its assessable income in that state.
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basis for the assumption of tax liability.20 At the same time, the
Group emphasized that such a principle should take into account
certain considerations: expenses allocable to the earning of the in-
come, so that such income would be taxed on a net basis; the
appropriateness of the sharing of revenue with the capital exporting
country; and the desirability of tax rates which are not so high as
to discourage investment.281
To deal with tax avoidance and evasion, a number of measures
could be adopted. Tackling the transfer pricing of TNCs entails a
basic practical problem: how to find and substitute a fair domestic
price for the price that an overseas parent corporation has charged
its local subsidiary for goods and services. The problem posed here
is that, in a majority of cases, a "fair" or "appropriate" price is
largely indeterminate; yet, whatever price is charged would have
considerable impact on the tax calculations involved. Empirical re-
search work in this area is very difficult. Ideally, not only must the
researcher have access to detailed information about the intra-cor-
porate deals of a TNC, but he or she also needs the expert assistance
of valuers to be able to ascertain whether a price charged in each
intra-corporate transaction was artificially low or high.
International practitioners may best benefit their clients by con-
sulting trade journals listing prices of, or discounts on, commodities,
as well as prices paid by independent companies. Quite often, how-
ever, the practical problem lies in finding adequate and reliable
sources. Exchange of information on prices pursuant to double
taxation agreements is a potentially effective approach. But, here
again, remains the problem that where the parent corporation located
in a contracting state deals directly with its subsidiary located in
another contracting state (the typical situation), the home state may
not feel inclined to supply information on overpricing if that would
adversely affect its own tax revenues. Exchange of information is
more likely to be forthcoming where the revenues of both home and
host countries have been adversely affected by corporations inter-
posed in a tax haven.
Transfer pricing is indeed one of the most troublesome aspects of
the allocation problem of TNC financial operations viewed in their
280. Tax Treaties between developed and developing countries, 7th report; Report of the
Group of Experts on Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries on the work
of its 7th meeting at 28-45, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/79, U.N. Sales No. E.78.XVI.1 (1978).
281. Id.
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global perspective. The clearly emerging solution is that home and
host states should enforce arm's length prices wherever appropriate
(i.e., prices charged between competitive or independent buyers and
sellers in a free market without collusion). The Group of Experts on
Tax Treaties, in its Seventh Report, also adhered to the principle of
arm's length allocation and devised a framework for procedural
arrangements.2 82 Among the methods mentioned in that report for
the ascertainment of the arm's length price are the uncontrolled
market price method, the resale price method, and the cost-plus
method. 2 1
In commodities where arm's length or competitive prices do not
exist (as in the case of monopolistic markets), TNCs could be required
to pay prices linked to the prices of the final product on the world
market. In any other situation, and in non-commodity areas such as
royalties and know-how where, again, competitive prices may be non-
existent or difficult to establish, TNCs would pay prices which are
objectively fair and equitable. In essence, this entails the use of
whatever methods are likely to achieve a reasonable approximation
to an arm's length price. Some of the methods mentioned in this
regard include the division of gross or net profit between manufac-
turing and marketing units of the TNC on the basis of factors such
as sales, assets, and payrolls; comparison with foreign customs val-
uation; and a unilateral price selected by tax authorities on the basis
of its own research or intelligence network.2m
Mention has been made of artificial intracorporate transactions not
involving commodity trading, such as interest on loans, management
fees, and royalties. The basic approach to obviously excessive claims
under any of these headings would be either to disallow the payments
as items deductible as a cost for tax assessment purposes, or to allow
them only up to some set percentage. In particular, tax on interest
could be assessed at the greater of non-resident withholding tax on
the gross interest or ordinary corporation tax rates on the net income
from the interest if the payee (the external lender) is an associate of
the payer (the local subsidiary borrower). In calculating the net
interest, charges (e.g., interest the payee paid to itself) could be
deductible. Management fees could be assessable at the full corpo-
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Administrative expenses (i.e., expenses incurred in the administra-
tion of the world wide operations of the particular group of corpo-
rations) also need to be considered. A parent corporation may seek
to claim in a particular country a proportion of the head office
administrative expenses, which were in fact incurred overseas, as
being applicable to the operations carried on in that particular
country. While defensible in principle, this sort of claim always raises
a question as to the fairness of the apportioning method. The host
state could reasonably resolve the issue by allowing a deduction for
a proportion of head office administrative expenses based on a
percentage of the local gross receipts. At periodic intervals, claims
of this nature could be checked, and a stipulation made for a
certificate by external auditors of the parent office giving such details
as the itemized list of the expenses included in the claim, 285 local
receipts, and total receipts for the enterprise as a whole. There is
also the possibility of apportioning administrative expenses on the
basis of the proportion that local expenses (rather than local receipts)
bear to the total or global expenses. As far as royalties paid between
associates are concerned, these could be assessed at the greater of
non-resident withholding tax on the gross royalties and ordinary
corporation rates on the net. Know-how payments (e.g., payments
for technical or commercial services), also could be assessed in the
same manner as royalties when paid between associates.
Branches of TNCs are often treated rather differently from sub-
sidiaries in various tax codes, the theory being that a subsidiary is
legally a different entity from its parent company. It is therefore
argued that when a branch and a parent office situation is involved,
internal payments or credits should be ignored for tax purposes. The
practical effect would then be that interest payable by the branch on
its head office account should neither be deducted by the paying
branch nor assessable to the payee parent office. A portion of the
interest payable, however, may be allowable against the branch
operations. Internal payments or credits for royalties, know-how
payments, management fees, and the like could be allowed if they
represent the bare cost of providing these services, but should be
discounted if they contain a profit element.
The abuse of tax havens is obvious from the above description of
the modalities of transfer pricing. A tax haven is defined as a tax
285. The list would show the expenses did not include any capital or other items not
normally deductible for tax purposes, and that they did in fact cover administering operations
of the kind carried out in the host state concerned.
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jurisdiction with zero or extremely low tax rates. A parent corporation
may always seek to avoid or defer its liability to tax on profits of
its foreign enterprise by using transfer pricing and other methods to
augment the profits in a foreign subsidiary located in a tax haven
or in a place which, although not a tax haven, has lower tax rates
than the home country. To combat this misuse of tax havens, bilateral
and multilateral treaties should establish clear guidelines for assigning
a permanent establishment to an entity situated in a tax haven and
interposed between related entities located in the countries which are
parties to the treaties. More importantly, tax treaties should contain
provisions on exchange of information which would form the basis
for obtaining information on the dealings between the related entities
in the treaty states and the tax havens.
Other methods of tax evasion and avoidance take much less subtle
forms than transfer pricing and the other artificial transactions just
addressed. Particularly in the case of tax evasion, this is often
accomplished by direct and outright misrepresentation of the opera-
tions of the business to the tax authorities, in areas such as the level
of profits and the value of imports and exports. In these cases, the
tax authorities could be empowered to impose their own tax assess-
ments on the basis either of assets or gross income. The tax authorities
would also need to monitor the operation of business enterprises
within their jurisdiction more closely, with a view to collecting more
adequate information on them.
Indeed, the whole issue of tax evasion and tax avoidance cannot
be divorced from the availability of adequate information. The point
already made about exchange of information in relation to tax havens
applies equally well to the entire subject of taxation. Exchange of
information could take the form of an automatic exchange of infor-
mation, information supplied on demand, or information on facts
deemed by the supplying state to be significant for taxation purposes
in another state. There should be machinery in place to afford a full
and complete disclosure of the financial transactions of TNCs not
only to make sure that they pay their full tax bills in the home and
host states, but also to allow the opportunity of comparing these
bills with corresponding ones in other countries. In the final analysis,
it is only through comparative information among countries that an
appropriate distribution of tax benefits among them can be attained.
This would also lay the foundation for more effective international
cooperation in the detection and punishment of tax crimes.
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CONCLUSION
In assessing the utility and impact of tax incentives, two essential
questions must be raised constantly. First, to what extent do such
incentives really motivate TNC investment? Put another way, would
TNCs not make the particular investment in the absence of such
incentives? Second, what are the trade-offs of tax incentives in terms
of the loss of public revenue and increased public expenditure? Before
incentives are granted, careful thought should be given to costs and
benefits. It must be clear that economic benefits would be obtained
which would not otherwise arise in the absence of such grants. The
procedures of each state should provide a mechanism for a review
of the benefits. Furthermore, there should be a policy of harmoni-
zation of tax incentives in countries comprising the same economic
region.
In various ways, the different approaches to the issues addressed
in this paper reflect a need for international co-operation (bilateral,
subregional, regional, and interregional) in the resolution of problems
of international taxation. This implies not only procedures for over-
coming the complexities of tax laws and differences in bases of
taxation which make comparability difficult, but also the development
of principles of equity in international income allocation. Interna-
tional legal practitioners, their clients, and national interests can only
stand to gain from agreements which heed such concerns.

